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Abstract:  
 
The recent emergence of the Euro, combined with the completion of a decade of North American 
Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) has sparked interest in adopting a common currency for North 
America. This study examines the likelihood that Canada, Mexico, and the United States will 
adopt a common currency under fixed exchange rate regimes. The benefits and costs of a 
common currency are explored using the theory of optimum currency areas (OCA). Empirical 
research focuses on several variables including intra-regional and intra-industry trade, trade 
openness, gross domestic product, inflation rates, interest rates, economic growth rates, business 
cycle synchronization, factor mobility, fiscal policy and monetary policy coordination. The 
analysis also presents a comparative analysis of NAFTA with Economic and Monetary Union 
(EMU) nations on different economic criteria. Finally, correlation and regression analysis further 
explores the likelihood that members of NAFTA will economically integrate. Though this 
research concludes that it is economically feasible for NAFTA members to move towards a 
common currency, this venture depends on the political readiness of the nations.   
 
1
Hugger: NAFTA TOWARD A COMMON CURRENCY:  AN ECONOMIC FEASIBILITY STUDY
Published by Digital Commons @ IWU, 2008
 2 
1.  Introduction 
 The recent emergence of the Euro, the common currency of several European countries, 
has sparked interest in monetary union amongst Canada, Mexico, and the United States. The 
Euro has given the United States an incentive towards a common currency as it has become a 
rival to the U.S. dollar’s market leadership throughout the world as the leading international 
currency. Though the U.S. dollar, also known as the greenback, is “indisputably the market 
leader among world monies,” 1 the Euro has become a recent threat to its power. The U.S. dollar 
accounts for nearly half the value in which the world’s exports are invoiced while the Euro 
accounts for roughly 15 percent of the exports.2 
Discussions of the movement towards a common currency have focused on fixed rather 
than flexible exchange rate regimes. The most common and most discussed regime is 
dollarization, which is the adoption of the U.S. dollar by Canada and Mexico. Some countries 
including El Salvador, Ecuador, and Panama have formally adopted the U.S. dollar as their legal 
tender, while other parts of the world informally use the dollar for international and inter-state 
transactions and recording purposes. A second approach in discussing a common currency has 
centered on the notion of a monetary union or currency unification. Rather than adopting the 
U.S. dollar, a monetary union requires an entirely new currency to be developed and managed 
collectively by the member countries.  
With NAFTA’s ongoing success in increasing exports, investment flows, and total trade, 
Canada and Mexico have shown an interest in further integration and cooperation and in 
advancing economic efficiencies through a common currency. The Bank of Canada governor 
                                                 
1
 Benjamin Cohen, “North American Monetary Union: A United States Perspective,” Global and 
International Studies Program (June 2004): 3.   
2
  Benjamin J. Cohen, “America’s Interest in Dollarization,” in Monetary Unions and Hard Pegs, ed. 
Volbert Alexander, Jacques Mélitz, and George M. Von Furstenberg, 290 (New York: Oxford University Press, 
2004). 
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David Dodge advocated for an update of the original NAFTA agreement since its 
implementation in 1993.” Support from Mexico has been fueled by the Mexican crisis in 1995, 
and in August 2000 Mexican President-elect Vicente Fox spoke to leaders of the United States 
and Canada proposing several ideas to further integrate the economies of NAFTA members, 
including a recommendation for a single currency.3 On October 23, 2002, Dodge recommended 
that there “ought to be a free flow of labor and capital, as well as goods and services, across the 
Canada-U.S. border.”4 More recently, in March 2005, a meeting between President Bush, 
President Fox, and Prime Minister Martin was held in Texas about plans to create a “super-
NAFTA” which proposed a new currency deemed the “Amero.”5  
This article examines the likelihood that Canada, the United States and Mexico will adopt 
a common currency under fixed exchange rate regimes based on economic benefits and costs. 
Unlike the majority of past research on North American common currency, which focuses 
primarily on the U.S. and Canada, this research will include Mexico as well. Based on OCA 
theory this study will consider the notion of adopting a common currency to upgrade or further 
intensify the original North America Free Trade Agreement. The paper is organized as follows.  
Section 2 focuses on the economic conditions and criteria based on optimum currency 
area theory. It also provides a review of the existing literature discussing the benefits and costs of 
a common currency for the members of NAFTA. Both dollarization and a monetary union are 
discussed. Section 3 empirically examines both inter-regional and intra-industry trade patterns 
and trends within NAFTA. Section 4 extends the empirical analysis from section 3 by examining 
                                                 
3
  Michael Chriszt, “Perspectives on a Potential North American Monetary Union,” Federal Reserve Bank 
of Atlanta Economic Review (Fourth Quarter 2000): 29. 
4
 Peter C. Newman, “Beware of Freer Trade,” Maclean’s 115 no. 48 (December 2002): 46.   
5
 Jerome R. Corsi, “The Plan to Replace the Dollar With the ‘Amero,” Human Events (May 2006), 
http://www.humanevents.com/article.php?print=yes&id=15017. 
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several other OCA criteria. Gross domestic product, trade openness, inflation rates, interest rates, 
economic growth rates, business cycle synchronization, fiscal and monetary policy coordination, 
and factor mobility amongst the three member nations are analyzed using correlations. A 
comparative analysis of NAFTA nations with EMU is also provided.  Section 5 conducts some 
regressions to identify further the benefits of common currency. The final section summarizes 
the significance of the analysis and provides some policy comments.   
  
2. Theory of Optimum Currency Areas 
 The decision for geographic regions to economically integrate and adopt a single 
currency is based on the Theory of Optimum Currency Areas (OCA), pioneered primarily in 
seminal works by economist Robert Mundell (1961), Ron McKinnon (1963), and Peter Kenen 
(1969). OCA theory describes a set of conditions that would ideally maximize economic 
efficiency through the adoption of a common currency. Mundell defined an optimum currency 
area as “an economic unit composed of regions affected symmetrically by disturbances and 
between which labour and other factors of production flow freely.”6 Mundell (1961) focuses on 
factor mobility and symmetry of shocks, McKinnon (1963) on trade openness, and Kennan 
(1969) on product diversification. Ideally, all countries considering a common currency should 
consider meeting the criteria for an optimum currency area.  
                                                 
6
 Barry Eichengreen, European Monetary Unification: Theory, Practice, and Analysis (Cambridge: The 
MIT Press, 1997), 51-72.  
 
4
Undergraduate Economic Review, Vol. 4 [2008], Iss. 1, Art. 5
http://digitalcommons.iwu.edu/uer/vol4/iss1/5
 5 
Traditional OCA theory is defined by these specific characteristics: international factor 
mobility, degree of openness of the economy, product diversification, financial integration, and 
similarity of inflation rates.7 These are addressed next. 
Literature on international factor mobility stresses several aspects of factor mobility that 
significantly contribute to a successful monetary union. Factor mobility is the degree to which 
factors of production (capital and labor) move freely between countries. A high degree of factor 
mobility means that labor and capital are easily and efficiently moved across borders. Mundell 
argues that “factor mobility is the key criterion in the choice [for] or against currency union.”8 
Sahin (2006) points out that for countries between which factor mobility is high, the degree of 
the adjustment in exchange rate risks, such as asymmetric instabilities and price rigidities, is 
lessened. With a high degree of factor mobility, if a country is subject to a shock, like a 
recession, then labor can move from one country to another. This helps to alleviate high rates of 
unemployment in the recession hit nation and allows the country to recover from the shock.  
 In addition, even when countries do not have similar structures, high factor mobility may 
make the movement towards a common currency more appealing.9 (Demopoulos and 
Yannacopoulos, 2001). When researching factor mobility, many economists begin by looking 
specifically at labor. Most economists agree that a high degree of factor mobility, especially 
labor mobility, are preconditions for an optimum currency area.  
In addition to a high degree of factor mobility, OCA theory suggests that economies 
looking to integrate should also have a high degree of trade openness. DeGrauwe (2007) explains 
                                                 
7
 Hasan Sahin, “MENA Countries as Optimal Currency Areas: Reality or Dream,” Journal of Policy 
Modeling 28 no. 5 (July 2006): 513-14.   
 
8
 Ibid.  
 
9
  George Demopoulos and  Nicholas Yannacopoulos, “On the Optimality of a Currency Area of a Given 
Size,” Journal of Policy Modeling 23 no. 2 (January 2001): 17.   
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that a highly open economy reduces the probability of asymmetric shocks occurring.10 If a 
country’s currency depreciates, the aggregate demand for its exports increases and its aggregate 
demand of imports decreases, which means the country can charge higher prices for their exports 
and pay higher wages to the workers. An economy with a high degree of trade openness also 
increases welfare gains associated with the elimination of high transaction costs and decision 
errors from conducting business with foreign currencies. A highly open economy can use 
exchange rate policy like depreciation to overcome an adverse shock, such as a recession (Figure 
1). The depreciation will raise exports and hence income for the country (from Y0 to Y1), but at 
the same time, it will bring inflation. The more open the economy, the higher the price rise. This 
is costly to the country. But, when a country adopts a common currency, it relinquishes the 
exchange rate policy. There are greater benefits of adopting a common currency for a more open 
economy, as the cost of giving up exchange rate policy is low. 
Figure 1 Depreciation Overcomes Shocks in Open Economy 
 
McKinnon (1963) similarly suggests the criterion for the degree of openness of the 
economy. If a country has a high degree of openness, meaning that the ratio of traded goods over 
                                                 
10
 Paul DeGrauwe, Economics of Monetary Union (Oxford University Press, Oxford 2007), 58-60. 
 Price 
Income 
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total domestic goods is large, a fixed exchange rate, as opposed to a flexible exchange rate, is 
beneficial.11   
Arndt (2003) argues that trade encourages similarity among industrial structures and thus 
reduces the problems associated with asymmetric shocks.12Intra-product specialization reduces 
asymmetric shocks as it increases business synchronization.  Krugman (1993) on the other hand, 
believes that specialization causes asymmetric shocks among nations because it emphasizes the 
differences between the nations.13  
In addition to product specialization and diversification, OCA theory also stresses the 
importance of a high degree of financial integration between countries. Although a high degree 
of financial integration overlaps with the international factor (capital) mobility conditions, a high 
degree of financial integration incorporates similarities in interest rates. Sahin (2006) argues that, 
“slight changes in interest rate will give rise to sufficient equilibrating capital flows.” The author 
opines that it acts as an “equilibrating element of payment imbalances.” According to Tavlas 
(1997) financial integration helps to absorb the shocks in the adjustment process in the short run, 
and eases the overall integration for the long run.14 A higher degree of financial integration 
allows for the possibility of maintaining fixed exchange rates. High fiscal integration enables 
                                                 
 
11
 McKinnon states, “Those countries which are major trading partners should maintain a single fixed 
exchange rate system because continuous exchange rate adjustments are costly and inefficient between economies 
which are integrated with each other.  
           
12
 In the end, the outcome is likely to depend on the relative importance of inter- and intra- industry trade in 
the integrated area. Where inter-industry trade dominates, as it would in currency unions between industrialized and 
industrializing countries, greater specialization and hence heightened asymmetry would be the likely result. Where 
intra-industry trade is dominant, as in the EU, greater specialization is compatible with rising correlation among 
business cycles, especially if specialization along product-variety lines is prevalent. Specialization in terms of intra-
industry product variety ensures that industry-specific shocks affect everybody.  
13
 P. Krugman, “Lessons of Massachusetts for EMU,” in Adjustment and Growth in the European 
Monetary Union, ed. Francisco Torres and Fransesco Giavazzi, 241-60 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1993).   
14
 G.Tavlas, “The International Use of the U.S. Dollar: An Optimum Currency Area Perspective,” The 
World Economy 20 no. 6 (September 1997):715.  
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areas to “smooth diverse shocks through endogenous fiscal transfers from a low unemployment 
region to a high unemployment region.” 
In addition to financial integration, countries looking towards a common currency must 
have similar inflation rates. Literature on the subject identifies the similarity of inflation rates as 
a desirable outcome because there will be no effect on terms of trade15. Other economic 
conditions include high levels of intra-regional trade among the countries and intra-regional trade 
relative to a nation’s GDP.  
 
2.1 North American Monetary Union (NAMU) 
 When a group of countries shares a common new currency, it is known as a monetary 
union. For Canada, Mexico, and the U.S. a monetary union differs from dollarization in that the 
countries would develop a new currency and manage it collectively. A North American 
Monetary Union (NAMU) would unite member countries in ways similar to those of the Euro.  
They would also have one North American Central Bank.  
Thus, Courchene and Harris (2000) explain that an “overarching central bank with a 
board of directors selected from the still-existing national banks” would be responsible for policy 
making for all three countries.16 Several economists and politicians have discussed the 
emergence of the amero, which would be Canada and the U.S. version of the Euro, in which 
monetary sovereignty would be jointly shared, and both the U.S. dollar and the Canadian loonie 
would be replaced. There is an abundance of literature on the U.S. and Canadian monetary 
                                                 
              
15
 Sahin (2006) notes that exceptionally different inflation rates influence the terms of trade between 
countries as the flow of goods is disrupted, the disequilibrium in the current account grows larger. While Tavlas 
(1997), if a country pegs its exchange rate to the currency of a country with a low inflation rate, the monetary policy 
unification becomes more credible. 
 
16
 Courchene, Thomas J. and Richard G. Harris. “North American Monetary Union: Analytical Principles 
and Operational Guidelines.” North American Journal of Economics and Finance 11 (March 2000): 3-18. 
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union, however, there is far less written about the inclusion of Mexico in the union. Throughout 
the literature both the potential benefits and costs for Canada and the U.S. are identified, and to a 
far less extent, the potential advantages and disadvantages to Mexico are included. 
Economists are unclear as to the U.S.’s interest in NAMU, however, there is some 
speculation. Cohen (2004) states that U.S. gains associated with reduced transaction costs that 
“would be fully duplicated by the dollarization alternative.”  
 With the theoretical threat of the Euro to the dollar’s role as the international reserve 
currency, a monetary union would allow the United States to compete on a more level playing 
field with the Euro. According to Chriszt (2000), a monetary union would make it easier for the 
United States to finance its balance-of-payments deficit more easily. Courchene and Harris 
(2000) agree that “the U.S. would presumably be in favor of a larger formal U.S. dollar area 
given its proclivity to run current account deficits.” However, the authors also argue that the U.S. 
would opt for dollarization as opposed to a monetary union as it would allow the country to gain 
wealth from seigniorage. Grubel (1999) argues in that a monetary union would lead to greater 
investment and trade opportunities for the U.S. as the NAMU could expand to include other 
countries including possibly the Central American and Caribbean nations. These countries would 
benefit from greater stability, which in turn would also allow the United States some relief in 
“bailouts of countries experiencing severe economic crises by promoting economic growth.”17 
Though the benefits to the U.S. seem small, the possibility for NAMU is still significant to some 
economists. 
Based on the literature, if Canada and Mexico agree to form a monetary union each 
country would reap greater benefits than they would as a result of adopting the U.S. dollar. If 
                                                 
17
 Herbert Grubel, “The Case for the Amero: The Economics and Politics of a North American Monetary 
Union,” The Simon Fraser Institute Critical Issues Bulletin (September 1999): 35.  
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both Canada and Mexico had a choice between a “well-functioning lender-of-last-resort with 
clear guidelines on how funds will be dispersed to financial institutions facing liquidity 
problems”18 and dollarization, both countries would choose the former. Courchene and Harris 
(2000) agree in that “although dollarization has substantial initial appeal to many countries in the 
Americas, over the longer term these countries will surely prefer some version of NAMU than 
dollarization.”19 The authors agree that Canada’s financial institutions and structures would be 
preserved with NAMU.  
Grubel (2000) points out that a monetary union for Canada would bring about “static 
gains” associated with reduced costs of foreign exchanges as well as decreased interest rates and 
exchange rate risks.20 The author also notes that there are “dynamic gains” in terms of increased 
labor market discipline, expansion of trade, and better structured adjustments in Canada. Chriszt 
(2000) mentions that a great advantage to Canada is that it would not forgo its seigniorage 
revenue, as it would with dollarization.21  
Seigniorage revenues come as more of a cost than a benefit for the U.S. if it is involved in 
a monetary union. Though seigniorage revenues would be returned to member nations equally, 
the U.S. would suffer losses associated with the widespread success of the U.S. dollar as an 
international currency. The gains from the speculated international use of the amero would be 
shared with Canada, instead of going directly to the U.S. 
                                                 
18
 Michael Chriszt, “Perspectives on a Potential North American Monetary Union,” Federal Reserve Bank 
of Atlanta Economic Review (Fourth Quarter 2000): 35.  
 
19
 According to De Grauwe (2007), “The costs of a monetary union derive from the fact that when a 
country relinquishes its national currency, it also relinquishes an instrument of economic policy, i.e. it loses the 
ability to conduct a national monetary policy 
 
20
 Grubel, “The Merit of a Canada-U.S. Monetary Union,” North American Journal of Economics and 
Finance 11 no.1 (August 2000): 19-40. 22-23.    
 
21
 Seignorage is defined by Aurebach and Flores-Quiroga (2003) as “the excess of the nominal value of a 
currency over its cost of production.”  
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In addition, the U.S. would suffer from “a loss in flexibility of macroeconomic policy in 
Washington.”22 As the American and Canadian economies unite monetary policy would be 
constrained because the countries are asymmetric. With asymmetric economies, the business 
cycles would continue to be unsynchronized, causing instability in both countries. Not only 
would monetary policy be limited, but fiscal policy would be restricted as both economies 
tighten policy to less budget deficits. 
Economists disagree as to whether or not Canada’s economy would face the same 
problem with the constraint of both monetary and fiscal policies. Gilbert (2007) explains that 
opponents of NAMU are concerned in that such a union “would disadvantage Canada because of 
the asymmetry of the Canada-U.S. relationship.”23 Grubel (2000) also addresses the losses in 
monetary policy, interest and exchange rate polices associated with a monetary union, as he 
believes they are rooted in a loss in national sovereignty for Canada. Alternatively, Grubel 
(2000), and Courchene and Harris (2000) see that asymmetric shocks would not be costly to 
either the U.S. or Canada. Courchene and Harris (2000) explain that adjustments to shocks and 
exchange rates would be addressed in other ways, “via changes in prices and wages, and internal 
migration, among other avenues.” Although many of the economists referred to above identify 
some of the potential costs of a common currency, the works by Chriszt (2000), Courchene and 
Harris (2000), Grubel (2000), and Arndt (2003) argue favorably for common currency in the 
future.  
There are economists, however, that argue against a monetary union. For example, Buiter 
(1999) argues that there are economic advantages to a monetary union but the overall “lack of 
                                                 
22
 Benjamin J. Cohen, “North American Monetary Union: A United States Perspective,” Global and 
International Studies Program (June 2004): 5.   
23
 Emily Gilbert, “Money, Citizenship, Territoriality and the Proposals for North American Monetary 
Union,” Political Geography 26 (February 2007): 147.   
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institutions for ensuring political accountability of a North American Central Bank means that 
NAMU is unlikely to happen and that, if it were to happen, it is unlikely to survive.”24 Carr and 
Floyd (2002), identify that sources of exchange rate volatility are real shocks and not monetary, 
and both the U.S. and Canada are subject to asymmetric shocks. Thus the adoption of a common 
currency would be highly unfavorable to Canada.25  
 For Mexico, issues of loss in fiscal and monetary policy are certainly a possibility, though 
the literature has failed to discuss specific costs to the country. Chriszt (2000) argues that costs 
rise with regards to the interest premium, defined as the “amount of interest a country must pay 
above U.S. rates on the international market for issuing debt.” The interest premium may be a 
significant cost to Mexican borrowers and a large obstacle in Mexico’s long-term economic 
goals as the country is still developing.26 
 Though there are apparent benefits and costs to each country involved in NAMU, 
economists have disagreed over many of the effects. Many economists agree that the United 
States is better off without a monetary union, though dollarization seems to hold more 
advantages than a monetary union. For Canada, economists recognize that the benefits far 
outweigh the costs, but there is still some uncertainty. The advantages and disadvantages for 
Mexico are ambiguous as much of the literature fails to include Mexico for a North American 
Monetary Union. Auerbach and Flores-Quiroga (2003) briefly acknowledge those who would 
benefit and suffer from a common currency in Mexico. The beneficiaries include export oriented 
industries, traders and grass root borrowers. For export-oriented industrialists, the transaction 
                                                 
24
 William H. Buiter, “The EMU and the NAMU: What is the Case for North American Monetary Union?” 
Canadian Public Policy 25 no. 3 (June 1999): 285-305.      
25
 Jack L. Carr and John E. Floyd, “Real and Monetary Shocks to the Canadian Dollar: Do Canada and the 
United States Form an Optimal Currency Area?” North American Journal of Economics and Finance 13 (May 
2002): 21-39.   
26
 To Mexican borrowers the interest premium is costly. For long-term planning and investment for the 
Mexican economy, the interest premium is a major obstacle as the Mexican government is working towards 
reducing the level and instability of the interest rate premium.   
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costs savings from a common currency are largely significant, while for domestically oriented 
firms may bear macroeconomic adjustment costs. As a result of lower transaction costs, Mexican 
banks may also benefit.27 Those who would be adversely affected due to increased foreign 
competition are domestically oriented firms, service industries and some Mexican bankers and 
financial executives.  
Section 3 next analyzes intra-NAFTA trade patterns over the last quarter century. 
 
3. NAFTA Intra-Regional Trade Analysis 
3.1 Intra-NAFTA Trade 
High levels of intra-regional trade will reap the benefits of a currency union as exchange 
rate uncertainties and risks are eliminated and countries save on transaction costs. High levels 
intra-regional trade between members of NAFTA also suggests that business cycles will be 
synchronized and that the countries are likely to be subject to symmetric shocks.  
  Figure 2 shows each NAFTA member’s share of trade with other members of NAFTA 
relative to the world. Data used in this section is sourced from the United States Commodity 
Trade Statistics database. 
Canada’s share of intra-regional trade in 1994 was 70 percent and in 2000 it decreased to 
68 percent. Since the implementation of NAFTA in 1994 the percentage of total imports of 
Canada from NAFTA partners relative to the world has decreased by roughly 10 percent and 
stood at 59 percent in 2006. Overall, Canada’s share of trade (exports plus imports) with NAFTA 
members relative to other countries has fluctuated slightly since NAFTA’s implementation. 
However, the total share of trade has hovered around 76 percent. This relatively high percentage 
                                                 
27
 Benefits to Mexican bankers may be attributed to intensified direct competition with foreign banks for 
providing low-cost loans for capital, and increased encounters with nonperforming loans in a downturn. 
 
13
Hugger: NAFTA TOWARD A COMMON CURRENCY:  AN ECONOMIC FEASIBILITY STUDY
Published by Digital Commons @ IWU, 2008
 14 
indicates that most of Canada’s trade is with the United States and Mexico and only about 24 
percent of the trade occurs with other countries outside of NAFTA. Canada’s relatively high 
percentage of trade with the members of NAFTA compared to the world is consistent with one of 
the criteria for the theory of optimum currency areas discussed in the previous chapter.  
Turning to Mexico, trade with NAFTA partners relative to world became relatively more 
stable since the inception of NAFTA. Though Mexico’s trade with NAFTA nations has declined 
by approximately eight percent since 1994, Mexico’s overall trade with NAFTA nations remains 
above 70 percent, which means that about 30 percent of all Mexico’s trade occurs with countries 
other than the U.S. and Canada. This decline since 1999 may reflect the U.S. recession and its 
corresponding impact on intra-NAFTA trade. 
Similar to Canada, Mexico’s relatively high percentage of trade with NAFTA members 
relative to other countries is also consistent with one criterion for the optimum currency area 
theory. Mexico’s overall trade with NAFTA members is also relatively high indicating that 
Mexico has a higher degree of intra-regional trade orientation with NAFTA members. 
 Finally, the United States’ total share of trade with NAFTA members is significantly 
lower than both Canada and Mexico. Whereas Canada’s and Mexico’s total share of trade with 
members of NAFTA compared to the world is between 70 and 80 percent, the United States’ 
total share of trade with NAFTA nations is roughly 30 percent. This means that more than half of 
the United States’ trade occurs with countries other than Canada and Mexico. Since 2001 the 
total share of trade with NAFTA has declined. Unlike Canada and Mexico, the United States 
overall trades less with members of NAFTA relative to the world. This is reflective of the fact 
that the U.S. trade structure is much more geographically diversified, with a large percent of 
trade presently occurring with countries in Asia, including China.  
14
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Figure 2: NAFTA Intra-Regional Trade 
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3.2 NAFTA Intra-industry trade 
Intra-industry trade makes countries subject to symmetric shocks and also promotes 
business cycle synchronization among nations. 
 One way to measure intra-industry trade between countries is the Grubel-Lloyd index. 
This index ranges between 0 and 1. If Country A has no imports from and no exports to Country 
B, Country A is assigned an index measure of 0. If Country A and Country B have exactly 
balanced trade for a specific product, both countries are assigned a Grubel-Lloyd index measure 
of 1. The Grubel-Lloyd (1975) intra-industry trade (IIT) index is quantified by: 
                                                                                               (1) 
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where Xi is the exports of product i by Country A to Country B, Mi  is the imports of good i from 
Country B to Country A, X is the total exports of all goods to Country B, and M is the total 
imports of all goods from Country B. 28  
 The Grubel-Lloyd indices for some industries—motor vehicles, motor vehicles parts and 
accessories, computer equipment, computer equipment parts and accessories, and aircraft for 
Canada and the United States are shown in Table 1.29 The IIT index for aircraft in 2006 was 
0.95, which means that the U.S. and Canada’s intra-industry trade for aircrafts was nearly 
balanced and of a high degree. Aircraft intra-industry trade has remained relatively balanced 
since 1986. Motor vehicle trade, with an IIT of 0.77 in 2006, is also relatively high between 
Canada and the United States. Computer equipment remains in the IIT index below all other 
products since 1986, suggesting less trade integration in this industry.  
Table 1: Grubel-Lloyd Index Measure of Intra-Industry Trade, Canada-U.S. 
 
Source: United Nations Commodity Trade Statistics Database, http://comtrade.un.org/; author’s 
calculations. 
 
As aircraft and motor vehicle industries have high degrees of trade integration between 
Canada and the U.S., the high IIT indices may indicate that business cycles are fairly 
                                                 
 
28
 H.G. Grubel and P.J. Lloyd, Intra-Industry Trade: The Theory and Measurement of International Trade 
in Differentiated Products, (London: Macmillan 1975).  
29
 For recent work on intra-industry trade among similar selected industries in North America see Ronald 
W. Jones, Henryk Kierzkowski and Gregory Leonard, “Fragmentation and Intra-Industry Trade,” in Frontiers of 
Research in Intra-Industry Trade, P.J. Lloyd and Hyun-Hoon Lee (Palgrave MacMillan: New York, 2002): 67-84.  
  1986 1991 1996 2001 2006 
Motor Vehicles 0.78 0.73 0.67 0.68 0.77 
Parts and Accessories for Motor Vehicles 0.71 0.68 0.55 0.56 0.61 
Computer Equipment 0.66 0.49 0.46 0.36 0.44 
Parts and Accessories for Computer Equipment 0 0.96 0.85 0.93 0.84 
Aircraft 0.86 0.93 0.98 0.76 0.95 
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synchronized. A low IIT for computer equipment indicates that business cycles are not likely to 
be linked or are not as similar as those for motor vehicles and aircraft.  
 Table 2 displays the Grubel-Lloyd indices for intra-industry trade between Mexico and 
the United States. In 1986, motor vehicle parts and accessories had the highest IIT index between 
Mexico and the United States. However, the 2006 measure shows a decline in the value of the 
index.30 Since 1991, computer equipment parts and accessories have the highest IIT index with 
an index approaching 0.9. Televisions have the lowest index value with an IIT measure of 0.11 
in 2006. 
 Table 2: Grubel-Lloyd Index Measure of Intra-Industry Trade, Mexico-U.S.  
 
  
1986 1991 1996 2001 2006 
Motor Vehicles 0.17 0.09 0.22 0.44 0.63 
Parts and Accessories for Motor Vehicles 0.69 0.28 0.59 0.49 0.23 
Computer Equipment 0.54 0.67 0.64 0.49 0.47 
Parts and Accessories for Computer Equipment 0.59 0.87 0.83 0.89 0.84 
Televisions 0.32 0.02 0.09 0.19 0.11 
Source: United Nations Commodity Trade Statistics Database, http://comtrade.un.org/; author’s 
calculations. 
 
 The business cycles for computer equipment parts and accessories for Mexico and the 
U.S. may be somewhat synchronized as the indices are nearly 1. Television business cycles are 
the least synchronized, or maybe not synchronized at all, as the indices are closer to 0.  
 
4. Empirical Examination of OCA Criteria  
Section 4 examines the degree of factor mobility within NAFTA. Then it uses correlation 
analysis to study business cycle synchronization in NAFTA. Finally, it also takes a comparative 
perspective and evaluates members of NAFTA and members of EMU for the extent of similarity 
                                                 
 
30
 Motor vehicle parts are imported by Canada from the U.S. are used in making a motor vehicle which is 
then exported back to the U.S.    
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in the economic development, economic growth, trade openness, and interest rate and tax 
revenue.  
4.1 Labor and Capital Mobility 
 High degrees of factor mobility, specifically capital and labor mobility, are conducive to 
countries forming a currency union. High degrees of factor mobility allow countries to adjust to 
shocks by moving factors, instead of depending on exchange rate changes or exchange rate 
policy.  
 Capital mobility within NAFTA is measured by the extent to which foreign direct 
investment (FDI) flows from the U.S. into Canada and Mexico. Figure 3 displays the degrees of 
capital mobility for Canada and Mexico in the United States. Both countries have highly variable 
degrees of mobility. Capital mobility for Canada is higher than that of Mexico, as Canada has 
received more FDI from the U.S. 
Figure 3: Capital Mobility 
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Source: U.S. Department of Commerce: Bureau of Economic Analysis, “U.S. Direct Investment Abroad: 
Balance of Payments and Direct Investment Position Data,” http://www.bea.gov/international/di1usdbal.htm. 
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 Following Goto and Hamada (1994), the share of labor inflow of foreign workers in the 
total U.S. labor force is used to measure labor mobility.31 The inflow of Canadians and Mexicans 
into the U.S. labor force is shown in Table 3.32 The total number of Canadians in the U.S. labor 
force has fluctuated since 1980. It decreased by about 79 percent between 1980 and 1990, then 
increased by 142 percent between 1990 and 2000, and finally increased again by 236 percent in 
2000. 
Unlike Canada’s contribution to the labor force which has fluctuated since 1980, 
Mexico’s contribution has continued to increase. Between 1980 and 1990 the number of 
Mexicans in the U.S. workforce increased by 20 percent. Again, the population increased by 
about 72 percent between 1990 and 2000 and then the number of Mexicans increased by 106 
percent. Of the total population in the respective countries in the U.S., 425,310 (55.6%) 
Canadians are in the labor force while 4,900,795 (60.1%) Mexicans are in the labor force. 
Table 3: Labor Mobility 
 
    Canada   
 Non-U.S. Citizen U.S. Citizen Total 
Population entering before 1980  151,520  324,625  476,145 
Population entering between 1980 to 1990  68,585  32,095  100,680 
Population entering between 1990 to 2000  222,610  21,340  243,950 
Total as of 2000  442,715  378,060 
 820,775 
     Mexico   
 Non-U.S. Citizen U.S. Citizen Total 
Population entering before 1980 1,027,170 1,117,830 2,145,000 
Population entering between 1980 to 1990 1,954,105  634,780 2,588,885 
Population entering between 1990 to 2000 4,134,425  309,175 4,443,600 
Total as of 2000 7,115,700 2,061,785 9,177,485 
 
 
                                                 
 
31
 Junichi Goto and Koichi Hamada, “Economic Preconditions for Asian Regional Integration,” in 
Macroeconomic Linkages—Savings, Exchange Rates and Capital Flows, ed. Takatoshi Ito and Anne Kruger, 359-
385 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994).    
 
32
 Source: United States Census Bureau, “Census 2000 Special Tabulations,” http://www.census.gov/. 
Labor mobility table is similar to Table 14.14 by Junichi Goto and Koichi Hamada (1994). 
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4.2 GDP, IPI, and Interest Rate Correlations  
Similarities in GDP and industrial production indices are suitable measures for business 
cycle synchronization as both are measurements of the member nations having similar trends in 
economic booms and recessions. Data used in section 4.2 is taken from IMF’s IFS database. 
Table 4 shows GDP correlations for Canada and the U.S., the U.S. and Mexico, and 
Canada and Mexico. The statistical significance of the coefficient is measured by the t-statistic, 
which is shown in parentheses below the coefficient. The U.S.’s GDP is positively correlated to 
Canada’s as the correlations coefficient is both positive and close to 1. With an R2 value of 0.997 
the U.S.’s and Canada’s GDPs are strongly related. The U.S. and Mexico also have positively 
related GDPs as the R2 value of 0.969 indicates. Canada and Mexico have the least related GDPs 
of the country pairs, albeit at a high level, with a correlation coefficient of 0.966. This R2 value 
also indicates that Mexico and Canada have positively related GDPs. Each country pair’s 
coefficients indicate that the GDP for each country is similar to that of the other countries. Also 
for each country pair the correlations are statistically significant.  
 
Table 4: GDP Correlations  
 
  
GDPCAN GDPUS GDPMEX 
GDPCAN 1 0.997*** 0.966*** 
  (115.274) (9.941) 
GDPUS 0.997*** 1 0.969*** 
 
(115.274)  (10.928) 
GDPMEX 0.966*** 0.969*** 1 
 
(9.941) (10.928)  
***Indicates figures are statistically significant at one percent using t-stat. 
 
The Industrial Production Index (IPI) measures the level of physical output for a country. 
High levels of correlation also reflect more business cycle synchronization. The IPI correlations 
for each country pair is shown in Table 5. Similar to GDP, each country pair has highly and 
20
Undergraduate Economic Review, Vol. 4 [2008], Iss. 1, Art. 5
http://digitalcommons.iwu.edu/uer/vol4/iss1/5
 21 
positively correlated IPIs. The U.S. and Canada have the most related IPIs with an R2 value of 
0.984. Mexico and the U.S. have the second most correlated IPIs with a correlation coefficient of 
0.971. Canada and Mexico have the least related IPIs with a coefficient of 0.935. The R2 values 
for each country pair are relatively close to +1, thus indicating that each NAFTA country has 
similar industrial production output to that of its partners. Again the correlations are statistically 
significant.  
Table 5: Industrial Production Index Correlations 
  
IPICAN IPIUS IPIMEX 
IPICAN 1 0.984*** 0.935*** 
 
 (5.078) (21.410) 
IPIUS 0.984*** 1 0.971*** 
 
(21.410)  (11.699) 
IPIMEX 0.935*** 0.971*** 1 
 
(5.078) (11.699)  
***Indicates figures are statistically significant at one percent using t-stat. 
 Monetary policy coordination as measured by interest rate correlations between each 
country pair are shown in Table 6. Using this measure, the United States and Canada have the 
most similar interest rates and hence most synchronized monetary policy, of the country pairs 
with an R2 value of 0.862, which is statistically significant. Interest rates are somewhat strongly 
correlated. The U.S. and Mexico have the least correlated interest rates of the country pairs with 
a correlation coefficient of 0.702, which is statistically insignificant. Canada and Mexico have a 
correlation coefficient of 0.730, indicating a positive correlation. However, it is insignificant.  
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Table 6: Interest Rate Correlations 
 
  Interest rateCAN Interest rateUS Interest rateMEX 
Interest rateCAN 1 0.862** 0.731 
  (2.252) (1.019) 
Interest rateUS 0.862** 1 0.702 
 
(2.252)  (0.892) 
Interest rateMEX 0.731 0.702 1 
  
(1.019) (0.892)   
**Indicates figures are statistically significant at five percent using t-stat. 
4.3 NAFTA vs. EMU 
 Countries with similar levels of economic development and growth and trade openness 
find it easier to form a currency union. Countries with similar interest rates imply they are 
following relatively similar monetary policies. This helps in pursuing currency and monetary 
integration. Tax to GDP ratios are appropriate indicators for tax structures. Countries with 
similar tax structures find it easier to form a monetary union because they will also have similar 
rates of inflation. Finally, similarity of government debt/GDP ratios implies similarity in fiscal 
policy among nations. This section compares GDP per capita, GDP growth, inflation rates, trade 
openness, interest rates, tax/GDP ratios, and government debt/GDP ratios for members of EMU 
and NAFTA for 2001. 
To better understand the likelihood that NAFTA will form a monetary union it is 
necessary to compare the above economic indicators discussed earlier for NAFTA against those 
for EMU. The standard deviations of these variables are useful in comparing similarity in these 
economic parameters between members of EMU and NAFTA. Table 7 displays these indicators 
for 2001. Data used here is from World Development Indicators. The year 2001 is appropriate 
because it was the year just before the Euro was adopted. 
22
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 Table 7: EMU vs. NAFTA OCA Criteria  
 
 
GDP Per Capita 
(constant U.S. $) 
GDP Per Capita 
Growth (annual %) 
Inflation Rate 
(annual %) 
Trade as 
% GDP  
Interest Rate 
(annual %) 
Tax/GDP 
Ratio (%) 
Government 
Debt/GDP Ratio (%) 
Austria 24,301 0 3 93 NA 21 18 
Belgium 22,783 1 2 166 4.163 27 22 
Finland 23,478 1 3 71 NA 23 21 
France 22,851 1 2 55 4.258 23 23 
Germany 23,366 1 2 68 3.659 11 19 
Greece 10,998 5 3 57 4.083 24 17 
Ireland 26,409 5 5 184 NA 24 15 
Italy 19,604 2 3 53 4.052 23 19 
Luxembourg 47,281 2 3 276 NA 26 16 
Netherlands 24,431 1 4 129 NA 23 23 
Portugal 11,165 1 4 68 NA 21 20 
Slovenia 9,952 3 8 115 10.875 21 20 
Spain 14,765 2 4 60 3.197 16 17 
Standard 
Deviation 9,640.21 1.55 1.61 66.70 2.66 4.21 2.59 
United States 34,484 0 3 24 3.452 13 15 
Canada 23,392 1 3 57 3.768 12* 12 
Mexico 5,864 -1 6 82 11.305 15 19 
Standard 
Deviation 14,430.11 1.00 1.73 29.09 4.45 1.53 3.51 
    *Data for tax/GDP ratio for Mexico is for year 2000 as data was unavailable for year 2001.
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The standard deviation for NAFTA’s GDP per capita is more than that of EMU. With a 
standard deviation of $14,430.11 for NAFTA compared to EMU’s standard deviation of 
$9,640.21, GDP per capita varies more between members of NAFTA than it does with members 
of EMU. The high deviation measure for NAFTA is attributable to the U.S.’s high GDP per 
capita at $34,484 and Mexico’s GDP per capita at $5,864.  
GDP per capita growth standard deviation measures are relatively close with EMU at 
1.55 percent and NAFTA at 1.00 percent. Members of NAFTA are more similar than members 
of EMU in terms of economic growth because the standard deviation is lower. 
Inflation rates are relatively similar for both sets of countries. NAFTA has a higher 
standard deviation at 1.73 percent than EMU at 1.61 percent. Although Mexico does not have the 
highest rate of inflation of all the countries (Slovenia has an inflation rate of 8 percent), the 
country’s rate is relatively high at six percent. In fact, the inflation rate for NAFTA would be 
lower than that of EMU if Mexico’s inflation rate was ignored.   
EMU has a considerably higher standard deviation in terms of trade openness than 
NAFTA. Of the EMU countries, Luxembourg has the highest degree of trade openness at 276 
percent, while Italy has the lowest at 53 percent. With a standard deviation of 29.09 percent for 
NAFTA compared to 66.70 percent for EMU, NAFTA members are more conducive to forming 
a monetary union with the lower standard deviation.  
NAFTA’s standard deviation for interest rates is higher than that for EMU. However, 
these results may be skewed due to the unavailability of data for many members of EMU 
including Austria, Finland, Ireland, Luxembourg, Netherlands, and Portugal. The EMU’s 
standard deviation at 2.66 percent compared to the NAFTA’s 4.45 percent means that NAFTA 
members may not be as similar when it comes to monetary policies for each country.  
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However, NAFTA has a lower standard deviation of tax to GDP ratios at 1.53 percent 
compared to the EMU at 4.21 percent. As tax to GDP ratios are good indicators of inflation rates, 
countries with similar tax to GDP ratios find it easier to maintain similar inflation rates. The low 
standard deviation for NAFTA may mean that inflation rates are similar between the U.S., 
Canada, and Mexico and may make it easier to form a monetary union.  
Government debt to GDP ratios are useful in determining similarities in fiscal policies 
between countries. NAFTA has a higher standard deviation of 3.51 percent than EMU at 2.59 
percent. 
NAFTA has lower standard deviations than EMU for the following variables: GDP per 
capita growth, trade openness, and tax to GDP ratios. This means that members of NAFTA are 
more similar than members of EMU in these areas for year 2001.   
 
5. Econometric Analysis within NAFTA 
 Section 5 uses regression analysis to determine the relationships between intra-regional 
trade, GDP, FDI, and exchange rates amongst the NAFTA nations. The first part describes the 
sources of data and explains the construction of the different variables such as gross domestic 
product, industrial production indices, exchange rates, and money supply (M2) growth rates. The 
second part identifies the regression equations and hypothesizes the expected signs of the 
coefficients. The results of the regressions are discussed in the final part.  
5.1 Data and Variable Construction 
 Three sets of regressions capture the relationships between different variables for the 
three NAFTA nations. The first set of regressions examines the different transmission and 
linkages between the U.S.-Canada and U.S.-Mexico that may affect macroeconomic instability 
25
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in Mexico or Canada. The GDP volatility of a country measures the macroeconomic instability 
or disturbances in the real (goods) sector, similar to von Furstenberg (2006).33 The second set of 
regressions analyzes the impact of exchange rate fluctuations and U.S. GDP growth on FDI 
flows from the U.S. to both Mexico and Canada, respectively. The third set of regressions 
explains bilateral trade flows between both the U.S.-Mexico and the U.S.-Canada by each 
nation’s GDP and exchange rate fluctuations.   
 The data used to run the regressions in this chapter include GDP, IPI, GDP volume, 
money supply growth, and exchange rate. Data is extracted from the International Monetary 
Fund’s International Financial Statistics (IMF, IFS) website. The data is quarterly and extends 
from the first quarter of 1980 to the third quarter of 2007.  
  A moving average, standard deviation of the GDP, IPI and exchange rates are used to 
capture the volatility of each series. The following equation measures the standard deviation, 
similar to McKenzie (1998), where m is the number of quarters:34  
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  The data is modified to construct the variables used in the regression. First, to determine 
the volatility of the exchange rate, the GDP and IPI for each country, quarterly data is converted 
to logs. Next, the difference between the logs is squared and summed by the quarter. Finally, the 
summed logs are divided by two and square rooted. Volatility is measured by standard deviation. 
Exchange rate volatility is also a measure of exchange rate uncertainty and exchange rate risk. 
                                                 
 
33
 George M. von Furstenberg, “Mexico versus Canada: Stability Benefits from Making Common Currency 
with USD?” North American Journal of Economics and Finance 17 (March 2006): 65-78.   
 
34
 McKenzie, M. “The Impact of Exchange Rate Volatility on International Trade Flows,” Journal of 
Economic Surveys 13 (February 1998): 71-106.   
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 Money supply growth is measured by taking M2 data for each country and determining 
the percent change from one quarter to another. 
 The U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis (USBEA) provided FDI data for the second set of 
regressions while trade data for the U.S. with both Mexico and Canada is sourced from the 
United States International Trade Commission (USITC). FDI data extends from the first quarter 
of 1994 to the third quarter of 2007. Imports and exports data comes from USITC for 1989Q1 to 
2007Q3. 
 Raw quarterly FDI data from USBEA is converted into logs before it is used to run the 
regressions. Exchange rate volatility is measured as described above, and GDP growth is 
measured by calculating the percent change from one quarter to the next.  
 Imports and exports between the U.S.-Canada and the U.S.-Mexico is summed to get a 
figure for total trade. Trade data available in value is divided by the U.S. Consumer Price Index 
(CPI) to get trade data in terms of volume, not dollars. The series is then converted into logs.  
 A two-stage dummy variable is used in the GDP and IPI regression set as well as in the 
trade regressions. The purpose of the dummy variable is to capture the effect of free trade 
agreements in North America. The dummy variable assigns the number 0 to those data from 
1980 to 1988 (before any free trade agreement was formed), value of 1 to the data from 1989Q1 
to 1993Q4 (when the US and Canada formed the Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement [CUSTA]), 
and 2 to data post 1994Q1 after Mexico joined the free trade agreement that is now NAFTA.  
 
5.2 Macroeconomic Instability and Exchange Rate Volatility 
The first set of regression equations that measure GDP and IPI volatility of both Mexico 
and Canada with the U.S.  are as follows:  
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Volatility of country i’s GDP = a0 + a1 (volatility of currency of country i with respect to U.S. 
dollar) + a2 (volatility of U.S. GDP) + a3 (country i’s money supply growth) + a4(FTA dummy)  
                                                                                                                                                       (4)                     
             where i = Canada or Mexico 
 
Volatility of country i’s IP = b0 + b1 (volatility of currency of country i with respect to U.S. 
dollar) + b2 (volatility of U.S. IP) + b3 (country i’s money supply growth) + b4(FTA dummy)  
                                                                                                                                           (5)   
           where i = Canada or Mexico 
   
       
 GDP and IPI volatility are measures of the macroeconomic instability of a country. A 
positive coefficient for the volatility of U.S. GDP or IPI variable (a2 or b2) implies that 
fluctuations in the level of economic activity in the U.S. are positively transmitted to fluctuations 
in GDP (or IPI) in Canada or Mexico. A positive coefficient for the volatility of the exchange 
rate with respect to the U.S. dollar (a1 or b1) variable means that fluctuations in Canada’s or 
Mexico’s foreign exchange market leads to macroeconomic instability in the country. As such, 
adopting a fixed exchange rate (like dollarization or a monetary union) would remove or reduce 
such impacts of fluctuations that cause macroeconomic instability. Macroeconomic instability 
may also be caused by the lack of sound monetary policy on the part of that nation’s central 
bank. Money supply growth for either Canada or Mexico is used as the control variable for 
monetary policy. A positive coefficient indicates that money supply growth leads to fluctuations 
in GDP or IPI. Results presented are based on four-period volatility. Those using two-period 
volatility remained unchanged. 
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Table 8: Canada’s and Mexico’s GDP and IP Volatility 
  CAN GDP CAN IP MEX GDP MEX IP 
C -0.005 0.015*** 0.082*** 0.000 
 (-1.475) (2.278) (4.380) (-0.095) 
CAD-USD volatility 0.106* 0.058   
 (1.853) (0.852)   
Peso-USD volatility 
 
 0.204** 0.043* 
   (2.073) (1.760) 
GDPUS volatility 1.018***  2.852**  
 (8.029)  (2.485)  
IPUS volatility  0.638**  0.537* 
  (2.176)  (1.784) 
CAN M2 growth rate 0.106* -0.036   
 (1.891) (-0.379)   
MEX M2 growth rate   0.038 0.054*** 
 
  
(0.345) (3.653) 
FTA DUM 0.000 -0.006*** -0.038*** 0.003 
  (0.407) (-2.866) (-4.028) (1.485) 
R2 0.625 0.271 0.755 0.395 
F-Stat 41.740*** 21.408*** 62.486*** 13.223*** 
N 105 105 86 86 
*** indicates significance at 0.01, ** indicates significance at 0.05, and * indicates significance at 0.10. Results are 
based on heteroskedasticity adjusted standard errors. 
 
 The first regression equation for Canada’s GDP volatility has three significant variables. 
The exchange rate and U.S. GDP volatility and Canada’s M2 growth rate are significant at ten, 
one, and ten percent, respectively. The positive coefficient 0.106 for the Canadian dollar to U.S. 
dollar (CAD-USD) exchange rate suggest that gyrations in Canada’s foreign exchange market 
lead to macroeconomic instability in Canada in terms of its GDP. U.S. GDP volatility is also 
significant at one percent. As the coefficient 1.018 indicates, fluctuations in U.S. GDP affect 
Canada’s macroeconomic instability. Fluctuations in Canada’s money supply growth are also 
significant, at ten percent. The positive coefficient 0.106 indicates that changes in money supply 
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growth positively affect macroeconomic instability. The dummy variable for the equation is 
insignificant.  
 In the second regression equation, which measures Canada’s IP volatility, free trade 
agreements, and the constant are significant at one percent and U.S. IPI volatility at five percent. 
U.S. IPI volatility at 0.638 positively affects Canada’s IPI volatility, while the free trade 
agreement variable at -0.006 negatively affects the volatility, by only a small amount.  
 For Mexico’s GDP volatility regression equation, the values for exchange rate (0.204) 
and U.S. GDP volatility (2.852) are significant at five percent. The large, positive coefficient for 
U.S. GDP volatility indicates that Mexico’s GDP volatility is positively affected by changes in 
U.S. GDP. Similarly, peso-USD volatility positively affects Mexico’s macroeconomic 
instability. The negative and significant coefficient for the free trade agreement dummy variable 
suggests that Mexico’s involvement in free trade negatively affects fluctuations in GDP. Thus 
Mexico’s joining NAFTA leads to more macroeconomic stability.  
 Mexico’s IPI volatility is affected by U.S. IPI volatility (0.537) which is significant at ten 
percent. Positive fluctuations in Mexico’s IPI is also attributable to peso-U.S. dollar volatility, 
which has a coefficient value of 0.043 at ten percent significance. Money supply growth, with a 
coefficient of 0.003 is significant at one percent, indicating that changes in M2 growth positively 
affect Mexico’s IPI volatility.  
 These results show that the magnitude of exchange rate volatility affects Mexico’s 
macro-economy to a greater extent than Canada’s. 35 
5.2 Exchange rate volatility and intra-NAFTA trade flows. 
                                                 
 
35
 Von Furstenberg (2006), using a foreign exchange regime dummy variable, finds that exchange rate 
volatility positively and significantly affects Mexico’s GDP volatility, while Canada’s GDP volatility is 
insignificantly affected by CAD-USD volatility over the period 1950-2003.    
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The following trade regression are used in measuring the extent to which GDP and 
exchange rate volatility affect trade between the U.S. and Canada, and the U.S. and Mexico: 
log(U.S. trade with country i) = c0 + c1 (volatility of country i’s currency with U.S. dollar)  + c2 
log(real U.S. GDP) + c3 log(real GDPi ) +c4(FTA dummy)                                                          (5)                         
              where i = Canada or Mexico 
 
A negative coefficient for the volatility of the exchange rate implies that gyrations in the 
foreign exchange market discourages trade flows between the U.S. with either Canada or 
Mexico. If the coefficient for either U.S. GDP or Canada (or Mexico) GDP is positive, then a 
rise in GDP promotes trade between the countries. 
 
Table 9:  Impact of Exchange rates on Canada and Mexico’s Trade Flows with the U.S 
 
  CAN Reg 1 CAN Reg 2 MEX Reg 1 MEX Reg 2 
C 13.566*** 14.502*** 7.657*** 10.101*** 
 (42.657) (34.205) (13.704) (13.089) 
CAD-USD volatility -1.119* -1.196**   
 (-1.851) (-2.346)   
Peso-USD volatility 
 
 0.342* -0.372** 
   (1.973) (-2.231) 
GDPUS  2.380*** 1.786*** 2.404*** 1.113** 
 (8.753) (4.859) (7.803) (2.223) 
GDPCAN -0.837*** -0.486*   
 (-3.564) (-1.716)   
GDPMEX   0.278 0.920*** 
   (0.793) (2.784) 
FTA DUM  0.088***  0.301*** 
  (3.160)  (3.906) 
R2 0.940 0.948 0.955 0.979 
F-Stat 362.532*** 312.211*** 490.474*** 788.245*** 
N 74 74 74 74 
*** indicates significance at 0.01, ** indicates significance at 0.05, and * indicates significance at 0.10. Results are 
based on heteroskedasticity adjusted standard errors. 
 
As shown by the results of the first regression equation, Canada’s trade flows are 
significantly affected by exchange rate volatility, U.S. GDP, and Canada’s real GDP. The 
negative value of -1.119 (significant at ten percent) for exchange rate volatility indicates that 
fluctuations in the exchange rate market between Canada and the U.S. are unfavorable to trade 
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flows. Trade flows are also affected unfavorably by Canada’s real GDP, as the negative value of 
-.0837 (significant at one percent) suggests.36 The coefficient for U.S. GDP of 2.380 is 
significant at one percent, and since this value is positive, trade flows increase as U.S. GDP 
increases. The R2 value of 0.940 suggests that Canada’s trade flows are explained by exchange 
rate, U.S. GDP, and Canadian GDP 94 percent of the time.  
 The second regression equation, which includes the dummy variable, again indicates that 
exchange rate volatility, with a value of -1.196 at five percent significance, has a negative affect 
on trade flows. Canada’s negative GDP at -0.486 and ten percent significance suggests that trade 
flows are negatively affected by this variable as well. On the other hand, U.S. GDP positively 
affects trade flows as the positive value of 1.786 indicates. Canada’s involvement in free trade 
(0.088) also promotes bilateral trade flows. Based on the R2 value of 0.948, exchange rate, GDP, 
involvement in free trade agreements, and U.S. GDP help to explain Canada’s trade flows 94.8 
percent of the time. 
 Mexico’s trade flows are positively affected by U.S. GDP (2.404 at one percent 
significance) and exchange rate volatility (0.342 at ten percent significance). The R2 value of 
0.955 indicates that 95.5 percent of the time, Mexico’s trade flows are explained by these 
variables. 
 The second regression equation for Mexico’s trade flows includes the free trade 
agreement dummy variable. With a value of 0.301 at one percent significance, Mexico’s 
involvement in free trade positively affects the country’s bilateral trade flows. Both Mexico’s 
GDP (0.920) and the U.S.’s GDP (1.113) also positively influence trade patterns. However, 
when the FTA dummy variable is included, exchange rate volatility negatively impacts trade as 
                                                 
 
36
 The negative coefficient for Canada’s GDP volume may be due to the high degree of GDP 
synchronization with that of the U.S.  
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the peso-USD variable value of -0.372. Exchange rate volatility, Mexico’s and U.S.’s GDP and 
Mexico’s involvement in free trade agreements explain 97.0 percent of Mexico’s trade flows. 
This last regression for Mexico suggests that exchange rate fluctuations are inimical to trade with 
the U.S. given Mexico has already joined NAFTA. As such, from a policy perspective, such 
fluctuations can be reduced by moving towards a common currency. 
 
5.3 Foreign Direct Investment 
 Foreign direct investment regression are run with and without the dummy variable using 
the following equation:  
log(U.S. trade with i) = d0 + d1 (volatility of i’s currency to U.S. dollar) + d2 log(real U.S. GDP) 
+ d3 log(real GDPi)                                                                                  (6)
 where i= Canada or Mexico          
 
Foreign direct investment promotes economic growth in the recipient country and 
deepens financial linkages between the two nations. A positive coefficient for the volatility of the 
exchange rate variable (d1) means that FDI from the U.S. to Canada or the U.S. to Mexico 
positively affects FDI flows, while a negative coefficient implies it adversely affects FDI flows. 
As such, this regression captures the impact of exchange rate fluctuations on FDI flows. In the 
same way, changes in U.S. GDP growth can cause changes in FDI as well. A positive coefficient 
implies that higher growth in the U.S. GDP promotes more FDI flows into both Mexico and 
Canada. A positive coefficient for the dummy variable implies the formation of a free trade 
agreement positively contributes to FDI flows from the U.S. to either Canada or Mexico. 
Canada’s and Mexico’s foreign direct investment flows are shown in Table 10. Mexico’s FDI 
inflows from the U.S. are negatively and significantly affected by exchange rate volatility as the 
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value of -5.339 indicates. CAD-USD volatility is insignificant in affecting Canada’s FDI inflows 
from the U.S.  
Table 10: Effect of exchange rates on Canada’s and Mexico’s FDI flows from the U.S. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
*** indicates significance at 0.01, ** indicates significance at 0.05, and * indicates significance at 0.10. Results are 
based on heteroskedasticity adjusted standard errors. 
 
                                           
6. Conclusion 
The present study examines the economic feasibility of NAFTA nations adopting a 
common currency. Certain results warrant summarizing. 
Firstly, both Canada and Mexico have high levels of intra-regional trade and trade 
openness. This is consistent with the OCA criteria as highly open economies reduce the 
probability of asymmetric shocks and reduce the costs of adopting a common currency. The 
United States, on the other hand, does not fulfill these OCA criteria because the country has low 
levels of intra-regional trade with NAFTA members as well as low trade openness.  
Secondly, intra-industry trade indices demonstrate that U.S.-Canada business cycles are 
synchronized for aircraft and motor vehicles while U.S.-Mexico business cycles are somewhat 
synchronized for computer equipment parts and accessories.  
  CAN MEX 
C 7.777*** 8.114*** 
 (19.171) (17.043) 
CAD-USD volatility 8.371  
 (0.989)  
Peso-USD volatility  -5.339*** 
  
(-4.060) 
GDPUS growth -0.016 -0.512 
 (-0.076) (-1.633) 
R2 0.018 0.169 
F-Stat 0.423 4.976** 
N 49 52 
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 Thirdly, interest rate correlations used to capture monetary policy coordination imply that 
U.S.-Canada monetary policies are similar, while Mexico’s financial markets are not as mature 
and efficient.  
Fourthly, factor mobility data indicates that Canada and Mexico have different degrees of 
labor mobility, as Canada’s contribution to the U.S. labor force continues to fluctuate while 
Mexico’s contribution continues to increase. Canada and Mexico also have different degrees of 
capital mobility. Canada has a higher degree of capital mobility than Mexico. Mexico’s mobility 
also fluctuates more drastically.  
 Fifthly, compared to EMU members, NAFTA nations are more similar for GDP per 
capita growth, trade openness, and tax to GDP ratios (and inflation rates, and in turn, supply 
shocks) than members of EMU. NAFTA members are not as similar to each other as EMU 
members in terms of GDP per capita (economic growth similarity), interest rates (capturing 
monetary policy similarity), and government debt to GDP ratios (measuring fiscal policy 
similarity).  
Sixthly, the econometric results show that bilateral exchange rate volatility leads to 
macroeconomic instability in both Mexico and Canada. From a policy perspective one way of 
bringing macroeconomic stability is by reducing exchange rate fluctuations through a common 
currency. For both Canada and Mexico, bilateral trade flows with the U.S. are negatively 
affected by exchange rate volatility. Mexico’s FDI flows are also adversely affected by peso-
USD volatility. 
 For NAFTA, a common currency is eventually feasible given all its benefits; however, 
the member nations must also investigate certain political aspects of adopting a common 
currency. 
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 The most discussed political issue in regard to adopting a common currency is the 
country’s compromised monetary sovereignty. Cohen (2003) argues that 
Direct political benefits are derived from a strictly national currency: first, a 
potential political symbol to promote a sense of national identity; second, a 
potentially powerful source of revenue to underwrite public expenditures; and 
third, a practical means to insulate the nation from foreign influence or 
constraint.37 
 
Countries looking to form a currency union must first consider the benefits of a national currency 
and the costs associated with giving up national identity. Labor mobility between the U.S.- 
Mexico is an area of concern both economically and politically.  
 The EMU was politically integrated before the launch of the Euro in 1999. In 1989, EC 
members outlined a three-stage plan toward the development of Economic and Monetary Union 
(EMU). The first step was to enhance policy collaboration, and in July 1990 the Committee of 
Central Bank Governors prepared annual reports for the European Parliament, the Council of 
Ministers, and the European Council. Multi-annual convergence programs were submitted by 
each member state and reviewed by the Council of Ministers.  
 The next step toward EMU began in January 1994 when the European Monetary Institute 
(EMI) was established to serve as an introduction to the single currency, the integrated monetary 
policy, and the European Central Bank (ECB). Lastly, the European Council met in December 
1995 to determine that the single currency would be called the Euro and would be introduced on 
January 1, 1999. Since its implementation, the Euro has become a threat to the U.S. dollar in 
terms of international use and purchasing power (Cohen, 2004). 
 Although NAFTA does not lag far behind EMU in adopting a common currency, under 
purely economic conditions, NAFTA does lack the political willingness and integration that 
                                                 
 
37
 Benjamin J. Cohen, “Monetary Union,” in The Dollarization Debate ed. Dominick Salvatore, James W. 
Dean, and Thomas D. Willett, 225 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003).    
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EMU possesses. The build up towards a common currency for NAFTA has not yet been 
politically initiated. Both economic and political harmony must be achieved amongst Canada, 
Mexico, and the United States before the initial steps in moving towards a monetary union.  
 This in-depth economic analysis demonstrates that a common currency is certainly 
possible, given the benefits that are discussed in this study. It is economically feasible for 
NAFTA to move towards a common currency, but this venture depends on political readiness 
and solidarity among NAFTA nations. 
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